Fresh Docker installs created the admin as admin@sub2api.local and accepted
any ADMIN_PASSWORD (e.g. "123456"), making them easy brute-force targets.
- Generate a random admin-<12 hex>@sub2api.local login email when
ADMIN_EMAIL is empty; drop the fixed default from .env.example and the
compose files, and have docker-deploy.sh write a random ADMIN_EMAIL.
- Validate user-supplied ADMIN_PASSWORD (8-72 bytes) and ADMIN_EMAIL on the
auto-setup path, only when an admin is actually about to be created, so
existing deployments are never blocked at startup.
- Align validateEmail with the login endpoint's email binding so setup can no
longer create an admin that can never log in (e.g. "a@b", "Name <a@b.com>").
- Cap validatePassword at bcrypt's 72-byte limit; the CLI reuses it and now
defaults to a random admin email instead of admin@example.com.
- Update READMEs/deploy docs to stop suggesting guessable credentials.
* feat(api-key): add IP whitelist/blacklist restriction and usage log IP tracking
- Add IP restriction feature for API keys (whitelist/blacklist with CIDR support)
- Add IP address logging to usage logs (admin-only visibility)
- Remove billing_type column from usage logs UI (redundant)
- Use generic "Access denied" error message for security
Backend:
- New ip package with IP/CIDR validation and matching utilities
- Database migrations for ip_whitelist, ip_blacklist (api_keys) and ip_address (usage_logs)
- Middleware IP restriction check after API key validation
- Input validation for IP/CIDR patterns on create/update
Frontend:
- API key form with enable toggle for IP restriction
- Shield icon indicator in table for keys with IP restriction
- Removed billing_type filter and column from usage views
* fix: update API contract tests for ip_whitelist/ip_blacklist fields
Add ip_whitelist and ip_blacklist fields to expected JSON responses
in API contract tests to match the new API key schema.
shaw