Remove unsupported none handling, align the auth cache version with the current baseline, consolidate the unshipped migrations, and update the public API contract.
Resolve const-block conflict in openai_gateway_grok_cache.go:
keep #4590's client tool cache constants, drop grokFreeRolling24hTokenLimit
(moved to pkg/xai as IsGrokFreeRolling24hTokenLimit with legacy 2M support).
Resolve conflicts with main:
- service/grok_media.go: keep both post-response blocks — #4497's empty
image-output failover (main) runs first for image endpoints, then this
branch's video-status content-URL rewrite; the endpoint conditions are
mutually exclusive
- handler/openai_gateway_credential_failover_loop_test.go: mark the stub
OAuth accounts media-eligible via the grok_media_eligible extra override,
because this branch moved grok media failover coverage to the generation
endpoint, which is now gated by #4540's paid-eligibility probe on main
Behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx with X-Real-IP), admin audit logs and
session IP/UA binding always recorded 127.0.0.1 because they hardcoded
the gin trusted_proxies chain, while API key IP restriction already
honored the "trust forwarded client IP" system setting.
- add ip.GetSecurityClientIP(c, trustForwarded) as the single source of
truth for security-sensitive client IP selection; API key auth
middlewares (main + google) refactored onto it with zero behavior change
- SessionBindingContext(cfg) now resolves the client IP via the same
toggle and injects it into the request context; token issuance,
binding enforcement and its mismatch audit record all read the
injected value, so issue/verify can never diverge
- audit log middleware and audit-log clear trace record the same
security client IP (middleware.SecurityClientIP), falling back to the
trusted proxy chain when the injection is absent
- settings UI hint (zh/en) documents the broadened toggle scope and the
one-time re-login after toggling while session binding is enabled
With the toggle off (default) behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admins often recreate groups with the same pricing, routing, and account membership. A server-side duplicate creates an inactive copy for review, preserves eligible account priorities, and recovers ambiguous retries without creating extra groups.
Constraint: Group has no neutral JSON metadata field for durable operation recovery
Constraint: Model routing references account IDs, so copied configuration requires matching bindings
Rejected: Rebuild from the list response | it omits configuration and account priority details
Rejected: Store operation identity in business configuration | it would pollute real group settings
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated groups inactive until an administrator reviews the copied configuration
Tested: Go unit and full tests, go vet, integration-tag compile, frontend Vitest, lint, typecheck, production build, and Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Admins often recreate monitors with the same endpoint, model, and request settings. A server-side duplicate keeps the stored API key out of the browser, creates a disabled copy for review, and uses stable operation identity to recover ambiguous retries without creating extra rows.
Constraint: Stored monitor API keys must never be returned to the browser
Constraint: Applying a request template must preserve internal duplicate recovery metadata
Rejected: Rebuild the monitor from list data | list responses only contain a masked API key
Rejected: Copy runtime state and history | a duplicate should start as an unverified configuration
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated monitors disabled until an administrator reviews and enables them
Tested: Go unit tests for repository, service, and admin handler; integration-tag compile; go vet; golangci-lint v2.9; frontend Vitest, ESLint, typecheck, production build; Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Admins often need another account with the same provider and routing configuration. Duplicate on the server so credentials never return to the browser, preserve exact group priorities atomically, start the copy paused, and recover the same copy after ambiguous idempotency-store failures.
Constraint: Admin account responses redact credentials, so duplication must remain server-side
Constraint: OAuth and setup-token credentials rotate and must not be shared across account rows
Rejected: Copy raw account JSON to the clipboard | exposes credentials outside the server
Rejected: Duplicate rotating credentials | account-scoped refresh locks can race token rotation
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep copies paused, avoid automatic upstream probes, and exclude rotating credential types unless token ownership is redesigned
Tested: Targeted Go tests, Go vet, server build; frontend lint, typecheck, Vitest suite, production build; integration test compiled
Not-tested: Docker-backed PostgreSQL execution because Docker is unavailable
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#1379
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#2928
Mirror the Admin UI Server-Timing opt-in for user-facing pages so
authenticated callers can inspect total/app/db/redis/deps metrics on
session, profile, keys, usage, payment, and related user APIs.
- Collect when X-User-UI-Request=1 or path is on the user allowlist
- Emit for non-admin only on allowlisted paths (header is not auth)
- Exclude payment public/webhook surfaces
- Mark matching SPA requests and allow the new CORS request header
zhaozewu