Fresh Docker installs created the admin as admin@sub2api.local and accepted
any ADMIN_PASSWORD (e.g. "123456"), making them easy brute-force targets.
- Generate a random admin-<12 hex>@sub2api.local login email when
ADMIN_EMAIL is empty; drop the fixed default from .env.example and the
compose files, and have docker-deploy.sh write a random ADMIN_EMAIL.
- Validate user-supplied ADMIN_PASSWORD (8-72 bytes) and ADMIN_EMAIL on the
auto-setup path, only when an admin is actually about to be created, so
existing deployments are never blocked at startup.
- Align validateEmail with the login endpoint's email binding so setup can no
longer create an admin that can never log in (e.g. "a@b", "Name <a@b.com>").
- Cap validatePassword at bcrypt's 72-byte limit; the CLI reuses it and now
defaults to a random admin email instead of admin@example.com.
- Update READMEs/deploy docs to stop suggesting guessable credentials.
deploy/.env.example documents POSTGRES_MAX_CONNECTIONS,
POSTGRES_SHARED_BUFFERS, POSTGRES_EFFECTIVE_CACHE_SIZE and
POSTGRES_MAINTENANCE_WORK_MEM, with notes on how to size them — but no
compose file ever passes them to the postgres container. A user who sets
them in .env gets nothing, silently.
Wire them into the postgres command in deploy/docker-compose.yml. The
fallbacks are the postgres:18 stock defaults (100 / 128MB / 4GB / 64MB),
so a deploy that does not set the variables behaves exactly as before.
Checked with postgres:18-alpine: with the variables unset, SHOW gives
the stock values; with them set (1024 / 1GB / 6GB / 128MB), SHOW gives
the set values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The redis command is one quoted script given to the inner `sh -c`.
Docker compose keeps the newlines inside the quoted string, so
`redis-server` on the first line ran as a complete command with no
flags at all, and --save / --appendonly / --appendfsync after it were
silently never applied (`redis-cli CONFIG GET appendonly` said "no").
Trailing `\` line continuations fold the script back into one command.
Checked with redis:7-alpine: appendonly is now "yes" and save is
"60 1".
Let admins configure private/intranet Guard endpoints without destination-class blocking, and fix prompt-audit switch layout so thumbs and labels no longer overlap.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## Changes
### 1. Enhanced Error Messages
- Modified CRS sync error handling to show detailed error messages
- Changed from generic "internal error" to "CRS sync failed: <details>"
- Helps diagnose connection issues with private CRS deployments
### 2. Security Configuration
- Added SECURITY_URL_ALLOWLIST_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOSTS environment variable
- Allows administrators to enable/disable private IP access for CRS sync
- Production default: false (secure)
- Test environment default: true (convenient for internal testing)
### 3. Flexible Configuration Support
- Added config.yaml mount support in both production and test environments
- Supports dual configuration methods:
* config.yaml for detailed/complex configurations
* Environment variables for quick overrides
- Priority: ENV vars > config.yaml > defaults
## Use Case
Enables CRS sync from internal deployments where CRS resolves to private IPs
(e.g., 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) while maintaining security by default.
## Files Modified
- backend/internal/handler/admin/account_handler.go
- deploy/docker-compose.yml
- deploy/docker-compose-test.yml
shaw