Files
sub2api/backend/internal/util/urlvalidator/validator.go
T
feeeei c227863d51 fix(images): 生图 url 回填下载拒绝私网目的地并只信字节嗅探
账户开关 images_url_to_b64_json 下载的图片 url 来自上游响应,是不可信输入。此前沿用
base_url 的 security.url_allowlist 策略,默认配置下只做格式校验,上游返回
localhost:8080 之类地址时网关会真的去请求内网。

- 下载 URL 主机为 localhost、回环、私网、链路本地、未指定地址的字面量时直接拒绝,
  不受 security.url_allowlist 配置影响(urlvalidator 导出 IsBlockedHost)
- 新增 ctx 标记 WithHTTPUpstreamPublicHostsOnly:共享上游客户端对带标记的请求无视配置
  校验解析后 IP,并为其克隆客户端挂 redirectChecker,重定向保持跟随但每一跳都校验
- 下载内容改为只信 http.DetectContentType 嗅探结果且限 png/jpeg/webp/gif,
  响应头不再作为依据
- 下载失败仍只记日志并保留原样;超时与端口策略不变
2026-09-05 15:50:56 +08:00

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package urlvalidator
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
type ValidationOptions struct {
AllowedHosts []string
RequireAllowlist bool
AllowPrivate bool
}
// ValidateHTTPURL validates an outbound HTTP/HTTPS URL.
//
// It provides a single validation entry point that supports:
// - scheme 校验(https 或可选允许 http)
// - 可选 allowlist(支持 *.example.com 通配)
// - allow_private_hosts 策略(阻断 localhost/私网字面量 IP)
//
// 注意:DNS Rebinding 防护(解析后 IP 校验)应在实际发起请求时执行,避免 TOCTOU。
func ValidateHTTPURL(raw string, allowInsecureHTTP bool, opts ValidationOptions) (string, error) {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if trimmed == "" {
return "", errors.New("url is required")
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(trimmed)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %s", trimmed)
}
scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
if scheme != "https" && (!allowInsecureHTTP || scheme != "http") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme: %s", parsed.Scheme)
}
host := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Hostname()))
if host == "" {
return "", errors.New("invalid host")
}
if !opts.AllowPrivate && isBlockedHost(host) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("host is not allowed: %s", host)
}
if port := parsed.Port(); port != "" {
num, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
if err != nil || num <= 0 || num > 65535 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %s", port)
}
}
allowlist := normalizeAllowlist(opts.AllowedHosts)
if opts.RequireAllowlist && len(allowlist) == 0 {
return "", errors.New("allowlist is not configured")
}
if len(allowlist) > 0 && !isAllowedHost(host, allowlist) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("host is not allowed: %s", host)
}
parsed.Path = strings.TrimRight(parsed.Path, "/")
parsed.RawPath = ""
return strings.TrimRight(parsed.String(), "/"), nil
}
func ValidateURLFormat(raw string, allowInsecureHTTP bool) (string, error) {
// 最小格式校验:仅保证 URL 可解析且 scheme 合规,不做白名单/私网/SSRF 校验
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if trimmed == "" {
return "", errors.New("url is required")
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(trimmed)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %s", trimmed)
}
scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
if scheme != "https" && (!allowInsecureHTTP || scheme != "http") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme: %s", parsed.Scheme)
}
host := strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Hostname())
if host == "" {
return "", errors.New("invalid host")
}
if port := parsed.Port(); port != "" {
num, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
if err != nil || num <= 0 || num > 65535 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %s", port)
}
}
return strings.TrimRight(trimmed, "/"), nil
}
func ValidateHTTPSURL(raw string, opts ValidationOptions) (string, error) {
return ValidateHTTPURL(raw, false, opts)
}
// ValidateResolvedIP 验证 DNS 解析后的 IP 地址是否安全
// 用于防止 DNS Rebinding 攻击:在实际 HTTP 请求时调用此函数验证解析后的 IP
func ValidateResolvedIP(host string) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns resolution failed: %w", err)
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
return fmt.Errorf("resolved ip %s is not allowed", ip.String())
}
}
return nil
}
func normalizeAllowlist(values []string) []string {
if len(values) == 0 {
return nil
}
normalized := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, v := range values {
entry := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(v))
if entry == "" {
continue
}
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(entry); err == nil {
entry = host
}
normalized = append(normalized, entry)
}
return normalized
}
func isAllowedHost(host string, allowlist []string) bool {
for _, entry := range allowlist {
if entry == "" {
continue
}
if strings.HasPrefix(entry, "*.") {
suffix := strings.TrimPrefix(entry, "*.")
if host == suffix || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+suffix) {
return true
}
continue
}
if host == entry {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// IsBlockedHost 报告 host 是否为 localhost、*.localhost,或回环、私网、链路本地、未指定地址的字面量 IP。
// 只判断字面量,域名的解析结果由 ValidateResolvedIP 校验。
func IsBlockedHost(host string) bool {
return isBlockedHost(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(host)))
}
func isBlockedHost(host string) bool {
if host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") {
return true
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
return true
}
}
return false
}