Cyber-policy detection only inspected response.failed, and the ingress check ran after error-specific early returns. As a result, error-shaped failures and the connection-pool, HTTP-bridge, and WSv2 paths could miss cyber-policy hits.
Centralize event marking and invoke it before retry and failover returns across the WebSocket implementations. Preserve the recorded guard during account failover and defer connection blocking until the logical failover chain completes, avoiding duplicate records while ensuring subsequent turns are blocked.
A collapsible sidebar group was force-expanded whenever the active route
was one of its children, so clicking the chevron did nothing: the toggle
only updated the internal set while isGroupActive() kept reporting the
group as expanded. Any click that produces no visible change reads as a
bug to users.
Track per-group expand/collapse overrides instead. A group without an
entry keeps the automatic behavior (expanded while active, so context is
not lost on load or navigation), but a chevron click records the user's
choice and that choice wins, letting an active group be collapsed and
re-expanded at will.
Follow-up to the event-time proxy snapshot: every upstream attempt now
carries attribution, the direct/unknown contract is enforced everywhere,
and the queued upstream_errors array has hard bounds again.
Attribution coverage
- compact fallback retry helper and the streaming compact failover event
now stamp proxy_id/proxy_name; the non-streaming SSE compact retry
previously dropped its first attempt on `continue` and now records it
- raw chat-completions stream truncation events (new on main) attributed
- Anthropic/Bedrock transport errors get attribution inside the shared
handleUpstreamTransportError helper, so all five callers inherit it
- OpenAI first-output timeout takes attribution from the caller: HTTP
callers pass the HTTP rule, the WS passthrough relay passes the WS rule
(no managed proxy => unknown, never direct, because http.DefaultClient
may honor environment proxies)
Contract hardening
- single opsUpstreamProxyAttribution returns (id, name) from one decision;
a hydrated Proxy without a durable ID is unknown, not id=null+name
- both normalizers (struct at append time, JSON on detail reads) enforce
proxy_id==null <=> sentinel name; blank managed name => "proxy"
- detail-read normalization edits only the attribution keys via sjson, so
keys from older struct versions and stored key order are preserved
Queue bounds
- keep at most 256 attempts and ~512 KiB serialized per entry, newest
first; the oldest retained event records dropped_earlier_attempts
- attempts outside the 16-event body window trim url/message to 512 bytes
- restore the empty-event drop rule, judged before the body window clears
detail so older real attempts survive
Tests cover each site above (managed proxy, direct, WS unknown), the
normalizer invariants, key/order preservation, and the count/byte bounds.
Qi HU